HUGO CHAVEZ : YO SOY LA MUERTE

ISRAEL EXPULSA AL EMBAJADOR DE VENEZUELA POR RIDICULO

EL REMIGEN GENOCIDA DE HUGO CHAVEZ FRIAS , MEDIANTE UN TRAPO ROJO , CRITICO LA ESCARAMUZA EN GAZA PARA TAPAR LOS MILES DE MUERTOS DE LA REVOLUCION BOLIVARIANA.
PREOCUPATE POR LOS MUERTOS VENEZOLANOS PENDEJO ... Y LOS ENFERMOS ...EL DEMENTE SIGUE ENVIANDO AYUDA A MUGABE Y EL PUEBLO HAMBRIENTO , ENFERMO Y BAJO ATAQUE DE LOS GRUPOS MALANDROS CHAVISTAS.
LOS PALESTINOS NO FUERON CAPACES DE CONVIVIR EN PAZ CON LOS JUDIOS POR QUE SON BRUTOS COMO LOS CHAVISTAS , Y POR ESO ESTAN COMO ESTAN

Venezuela 2009: More Chaos

Food shortages, electricity outages, labor strikes and popular protests will increase in Venezuela this year.
BY GUSTAVO CORONEL

What will happen in Venezuela in 2009? I will not try to answer this question in the proper, correct manner, of outlining three basic, possible scenarios and assigning probabilities to each. I will simply offer you a prediction, based on feelings and guesses.

THE ROAD TO MUGABE

In the political scene, I believe that President Hugo Chavez will force a referendum on a constitutional reform that would allow him to be re-elected. This seems an easy prediction to make, since the National Electoral Council, led by members of Chavez's clique, are already making the arrangements for this event to take place during the first quarter of 2009. I believe Chavez will lose this referendum and that he will try to commit fraud. However, the close monitoring of the opposition and some arm-twisting from the armed forces will force him to accept the results, just as it happened in December 2007.

Confronted with a new electoral defeat and an incoming financial crisis, Chavez will shed all remaining pretenses of democratic rule and will become openly autocratic. His speeches and actions will become much more aggressive. Nationalizations will give way to expropriations without due process. He could even declare a national emergency, formally suspending all constitutional rights and might send to prison one or more members of the opposition, under charges of corruption or of conspiring against his life or his regime. He could decide to close down GLOBOVISION and, even, El Nacional daily newspaper.

His cabinet will be significantly modified, this time to be made up of his most unconditional followers: Carreño, Maduro, his brother Adan, Isturiz and the like. He might come to a confrontation with Cabello. In essence, he will adopt a strategy of political retrenchment, further developing a siege mentality. He will take measures that will be openly dictatorial in the economic sector.

DEEPER INTO CHAOS

Chavez might be forced to take several controversial financial steps during 2009:

1). He might refuse to acknowledge Venezuelan debts, following on Correa's recent example in Ecuador. By doing this, he will attempt at negotiating with Venezuelan creditors a more favorable financial arrangement, although this would be clearly immoral and would prove to be suicidal from a national perspective, placing Venezuela in the category of a financial rogue state.

2). He will have to face a huge fiscal deficit. His 2009 budget is close to $90 billion, bigger than Colombia's, a country with more population, and he has built it on an oil production level of 3.2 million barrels per day and an average oil price for the year of $60 a barrel. This is pure fiction, since production is closer to 2.4 million barrels per day and the average oil price could well be in the $50 per barrel during 2009. Therefore, in order to make ends meet he will have to devalue the Bolivar by about 30 percent. International borrowing is out of the question. No banks or countries will lend him more money, since China, Russia and Iran are experiencing their own acute problems.

3). He will have to cut his social programs. He has already started to do this. He will also have to suspend help to {nicaraguan president Daniel] Ortega, [Bolivian president Evo] Morales, [Paraguayan president Fernando] Lugo, [Salvadorian presidential candidate Mauricio] Funes and [Argentine president Cristina] Kirchner. Either one of these two actions will create severe political problems for him.

4). Levels of imports will have to be reduced. They are now at some $40 billion per year and this is unsustainable under the new financial situation.

5). Although he would have to reduce oil exports to comply with OPEC's quota restrictions he will try to cheat because he is already producing much less than what he claims. Petroleos de Venezuela will experience severe cash flow problems, delay payments to contractors and project execution and reduce maintenance and required investments. This, in turn, will result in further loss of production in the short term.

6). Corruption will increase, as his followers and the parasitic bureaucracy he has created will try to grab as much as they can, in case the regime collapses (raspar la olla is the Venezuelan term).

7). Food shortages, electricity outages, labor strikes and popular protests will increase, as the regime will be unable to maintain public utilities in good operating shape and incapable to fulfill its obligations and promises to the nation. The regime will enter into a spiral from which it might not be able to recover, unless another dramatic surge in oil prices takes place.

SOCIAL SECTOR

Handouts to the Venezuelan poor have been the backbone of Chavez's strategy to consolidate political power. As oil income was significant he could afford to keep everyone happy at the same time. This will no longer be possible in 2009. Furthermore, Chavez will want to “punish” those that did not vote for him. He has already blamed poor sectors of the population, such as the Petare marginal area, for his electoral loss of Caracas in November 2008. The “Misiones” will start to reach less Venezuelans and this will create increasing unrest among the poor. The food distribution business will continue, although with increasing levels of corruption and inefficiency. The literacy program will be essentially abandoned since it has been unable to surpass an asymptotic 93 percent existing in Venezuela since the 1990's. Educational projects making use of the artificial satellite Simon Bolivar will die at birth, for lack of trained personnel.

There is a small possibility of violence in the country. Venezuelans have been suffering increasing humiliations and social ailments during the Chavez regime. However, this has been a slow and systematic process, similar to the boiling of a live frog, done by careful increase of the water [political] temperature. For some years, Chavez was almost successful in boiling democratic Venezuela without the frog jumping out of the pail. However, his attempt at becoming president for life in 2007 and his renewed effort in 2008 made the frog jump out and are not going back in. Venezuelans might resort to violence to force him out but all indications suggest that this will not be necessary, as the regime is clearly imploding.

AFTER CHAVEZ

Although Chavez will probably survive 2009 it is time for Venezuelans to consider what will happen after he is gone. This is not an easy question, as the country is in ruins, both materially and spiritually. Political instability, financial and economic chaos and high levels of social and, even, racial, friction dominate our nation and will continue to do so for some time after Chavez is gone from the presidency. Chavez and his band will not quit politics and will continue to be an important factor of national unrest. An all out effort will have to be made to put Venezuela back on a democratic track. If there is something positive to be learned from the Chavez's nightmare is that the poor have to be taken into account, not at the exclusion of every other component of our society, as Chavez has done, but as a component that needs attention and urgent upgrading and not handouts, empty promises and rhetoric.

NO ES NO

MEDIO SIGLO PELANDO BOLAS : GRACIAS A FIDEL CASTRO

The Cuban revolution turned 50 years old last week, and its founder and undertaker was still around to celebrate the anniversary, though not in the best of health or spirits. This makes it a good opportunity to summarize what the revolution has brought to Cuba and what is has meant for Latin America.
There is only one indisputable success the Castro regime can claim for the country. Cuba was the last large territory in Latin America to achieve independence from Spain (in 1898), and that freedom was diluted almost immediately, when in 1905 Cuba became a virtual American protectorate under the Platt amendment. This neocolonial status lasted until 1959, creating an enduring challenge to national identity. Castro and the revolution addressed that problem by giving the Cuban people a sense of statehood and pride. One can rightly wonder whether, after 30 years of dependence on the Soviet Union and nearly another decade of reliance on Venezuelan aid, this great national dignity is justified. But there's no doubting the strength of the sentiment.
As for the other, oft-touted successes of the regime, these tend to deteriorate under inspection. Take education. Yes, the country made huge gains during the first two or three decades of communist rule. But it started from a relatively high Latin American standard, and has barely treaded water ever since, producing tens of thousands of graduates in "historical materialism" and "culturology." Lacking most modern tools such as computers, Web access and current textbooks and a connection with the real economy, Cuba's supposedly excellent education system would probably compare much less well to those of other Latin American countries in a survey that didn't depend on the government's own statistics. Cuba would probably turn out to suffer the same ills as the rest of the region: formal universal education up to junior high or high school, but terribly mediocre quality and a total disconnect from the country's needs.

CADIVI : REDUCCION DEL CUPO DE DIVISAS

Desde el 01 de enero de 2009
CADIVI FIJA NUEVOS MONTOS PARA CONSUMOS CON TARJETAS DE CRÉDITO

***Los US$ 400 para pagos efectuados a proveedores en el exterior desde la República Bolivariana de Venezuela se mantienen igual.

***Autorizaciones de divisas otorgadas para viajes al exterior activadas bajo la modalidad de medios propios, estarán vigentes hasta el 05 de enero de 2009.

El 01 de enero de 2009 entrará en vigencia la providencia Nº 093 que deroga a la providencia Nº 084, vigente desde el 27 de diciembre de 2007.

La nueva providencia establece los requisitos, controles y trámite para la autorización de adquisición de divisas destinadas al pago de consumos en el exterior, específicamente: el pago con tarjetas de crédito de consumos de bienes y prestación de servicios efectuados con ocasión de viajes al exterior, pagos efectuados a proveedores en el exterior desde la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y la adquisición de efectivo para viajes al exterior así como los nuevos montos autorizados y la vigencia de las autorizaciones de divisas otorgadas para viajes al exterior activadas bajo la modalidad de medios propios.

La providencia Nº 093 fue publicada en la Gaceta Oficial Nº 39.089 del 30 de diciembre de 2008 e incluye cambios respecto de su predecesora, en los artículos 10, 11, 19, 23, 24 y en las disposiciones finales.

En el artículo 10, la normativa establece que “La Comisión de Administración de Divisas (CADIVI) podrá autorizar hasta un monto máximo de dos mil quinientos dólares de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica (US$ 2.500) o su equivalente en otras divisas por año, es decir, en el período comprendido entre el 1° de enero y el 31 de diciembre, a cada usuario, para el pago con tarjetas de crédito de consumos de bienes y prestación de servicios, efectuados con ocasión de viajes al exterior”.

Entre tanto, el artículo 19 señala que “Cuando se trate de tarjetas de crédito habilitadas a los fines previstos en el artículo 10 de esta Providencia, el usuario podrá disponer mensualmente de doscientos cincuenta dólares de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica (US$ 250) deducibles del monto establecido en el referido artículo, para adelantos de efectivo en moneda extranjera, los cuales sólo podrá obtener a través de los Cajeros Automáticos ubicados en el exterior”.

En lo que se refiere a la adquisición de efectivo para viajes al exterior, CADIVI podrá autorizar la entrega en efectivo o cheques de viajero, por una sola vez en el año calendario, es decir, en el período comprendido entre el 1° de enero y el 31 de diciembre, hasta cuatrocientos euros (€400) para usuarios con destino a los países señalados en listado publicado oficialmente en la página electrónica de CADIVI, o hasta quinientos dólares de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica (US$ 500) para otros destinos.

Otro de los cambios que contempla la providencia Nº 093, destaca la exclusión de la modalidad de declaración jurada ante el operador cambiario cuando el usuario se traslade a través de medios de transporte de su propiedad, tanto para la adquisición de divisas para el pago con tarjetas de crédito de consumos de bienes y prestación de servicios, efectuados con ocasión de viajes al exterior, como para la solicitud de efectivo para viajes.

En este sentido, señala en su única disposición transitoria que “Todas las Autorizaciones de Adquisición de Divisas para el pago con tarjetas de crédito de consumos de bienes y prestación de servicios, efectuados con ocasión de viajes al exterior, otorgadas a los usuarios y que fueron originadas utilizando medio de transporte propio, se mantendrán vigentes hasta el 05 de enero de 2009”.

Por otra parte, en las disposiciones finales de la providencia Nº 093 “Se prohíbe a los operadores cambiarios autorizados tramitar ante la Comisión de Administración de Divisas (CADIVI), la activación de tarjetas de crédito a partir del 01 de enero de 2009 a nuevos tarjetahabientes, para el pago de consumo de bienes y prestación de servicios, efectuados con ocasión de viajes al exterior, hasta tanto dicha tarjeta de crédito tenga más de seis (6) meses de emitida”.

Para mayor información, la Providencia está disponible en la página electrónica de la Comisión a través del siguiente link: http://www.cadivi.gob.ve/normativa/providencias.html.

Gerencia de Comunicación, Información y Relaciones Institucionales.



Diciembre